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WHERE BREAKING GLASS CEILINGS
LEADS TO GLASS WALLS:
GENDER-DISPARATE MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING POWER AND AUTHORITY
Bina Nayee*
Today, litigation over plainly discriminatory employment practices is
much less common than it was in the two decades following Title VII’s
enactment as employers have largely reformed practices that most obviously
violate employment discrimination law. But many less obvious employment
practices, particularly those embedded in implicit bias or unconscious sex
stereotyping, remain. One example is employers’ distribution of managerial
decision-making power and authority based on assumptions about sex.
Although this particular employment practice has not yet been litigated,
there is a strong argument that a legal challenge to this practice could
succeed.
This Note argues that female managers can and should seek legal redress
under Title VII when they are given less decisional authority under
conditions that can only be explained by some implicit bias or sex
stereotyping. Both disparate treatment theory and disparate impact theory
provide viable paths for a litigant to pursue. Upon weighing the incentives
and drawbacks under each theory, this Note concludes that disparate
treatment theory offers the most promising and beneficial remedial pathway
for potential litigants.
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 372
I. INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGERIAL DECISION-MAKING
POWER AND AUTHORITY ....................................................... 374
A. Manifestations of the Problem .......................................... 374
B. Causes and Contributing Factors..................................... 375
C. Why Gender-Disparate Decision-Making Power
Matters ............................................................................ 379
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, The University of
Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Professor Tanya K. Hernández for her guidance and feedback
in this project. I am also particularly indebted to the many women in leadership positions
whom I have spoken with to learn more about this topic. Finally, I thank my mother for
introducing to me at a young age the importance of sex equality.

371

372

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

II. A BACKGROUND IN GENDER IMBALANCED DECISION-MAKING
POWER AND SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW ............................... 380
A. Why the Law Must Address This Problem ........................ 380
B. A Brief History and Evolution of Sex Discrimination
Law ................................................................................. 382
C. Qualifications for Bringing a Title VII Claim .................. 386
D. Types of Discrimination Suits .......................................... 387
1. Disparate Treatment Theory ...................................... 387
2. Disparate Impact Theory............................................ 390
E. Litigation Remedies .......................................................... 392
III. A PIONEERING SEX DISCRIMINATION SUIT: TITLE VII LEGAL
THEORIES APPLIED TO GENDER INEQUITY IN DECISIONMAKING ................................................................................. 393
A. Preliminary Considerations for Sex Discrimination
Suits ................................................................................ 394
B. Pursuing a Disparate Treatment Lawsuit ........................ 395
C. Pursuing a Disparate Impact Lawsuit.............................. 400
D. The Most Viable Path to Success ..................................... 402
E. Judicial Unawareness....................................................... 404
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 404
INTRODUCTION
While employers have grown increasingly more compliant with
employment laws that bar overt forms of sex discrimination in the workplace,
they have failed to address less perceptible but critical forms of inequity. As
one scholar notes, “Smoking guns— . . . [like a] rejection explained by the
comment that ‘this is no job for a woman’—are largely things of the past. . . .
Cognitive bias, structures of decision making, and patterns of interaction
have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued
inequality.”1 Existing literature addresses unconscious discrimination that
prevents women from ever reaching desirable management positions.2
However, there is little attention paid to the discrimination women face even
after breaking the so-called “glass ceiling.”
One manifestation of this subtle discrimination is in the distribution of
authority and decision-making power between men and women in
managerial positions. This Note defines this problem as gender inequity in
decision-making processes. Although women are increasingly attaining
managerial titles, these titles often carry a lower level of meaningful authority

1. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001) (footnote omitted).
2. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a
Barrier to Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
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than is expected from men in the same roles.3 For example, it is problematic
that sex or gender stereotyping results in female managers receiving
decision-making power over less financially important divisions in their
workplace. Another troubling consequence is female managers receiving
less authority over high-profile projects or personnel than their male
colleagues.4
When such discrimination occurs to female managers at the higher
echelons of decision-making, it is hard to believe that they can achieve
redress from their employers, who have created and sustained the inequity.
No litigation seeking relief for unequal decision-making power exists. Thus,
it appears that female managers facing gender inequity in decision-making
processes have no path toward reform or redress.
Courts have not sufficiently addressed or relieved subtle forms of
employment discrimination.5 There exists litigation and literature addressing
employees who are harmed by managers’ excessively subjective decisionmaking processes, but few courts or scholars tackle the disparate power
between decision makers themselves.6 The law must grapple with the
inequity that exists among individuals in the decision-making bodies
themselves.7
Despite the absence of case law addressing gender inequity in decisionmaking processes, this Note argues that Title VII provides a cause of action
for female managers who face this form of discrimination. Part I introduces
the existence and causes of disparate decisional roles that male and female
managers assume, and why this problem matters. Part II presents the
evolution of Title VII’s application to sex discrimination claims. It also
presents the procedural and substantive legal requirements for filing a viable
employment discrimination suit. Part III applies two separate Title VII legal
3. See generally Barbara F. Reskin & Catherine E. Ross, Jobs, Authority and Earnings
Among Managers: The Continuing Significance of Sex, 14 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 342 (1992)
(describing ways in which female managers’ professional experiences differ from their male
counterparts).
4. See, e.g., Mohamad G. Alkadry et al., Beyond Representation: Gender, Authority,
and City Managers, REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN., 2017, at 1, 15–16 (describing the sex
disparity in municipal managers’ “authority profile,” which considers the budget amount and
personnel that a manger oversees); Caroline Fairchild, More Women Business Leaders Does
Not Mean More Power, FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/24/womenboards-power/ [https://perma.cc/4RAH-ZS79]. Fairchild explains that women in senior
management positions are concentrated in service or support roles rather than operational
roles. Id. The high concentration of women in “service” management positions supports the
findings that even as managers, women are generally confined to less important projects.
5. Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII,
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 540–44 (2003) (providing examples of subtle forms of
discrimination that have not seen legal redress).
6. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination,
56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 743 (2005); Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking
Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1331 (1995).
7. See Beth Mintz & Daniel H. Krymkowski, The Ethnic, Race, and Gender Gaps in
Workplace Authority: Changes over Time in the United States, 51 SOC. Q. 20, 20–21 (2010)
(explaining that gender-disparate authority remains even after the influx of women into
management positions in the late twentieth century).
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theories to gender inequity in managerial decision-making processes and
concludes that a disparate treatment suit presents the most promising legal
avenue for a plaintiff. Part III also identifies existing roadblocks to the
proposed use of Title VII. After addressing these hurdles, this Note
concludes that courts should recognize that the next stage of Title VII’s
evolution is tackling this new frontier of unconscious or subtle sex-based
discrimination.
I. INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGERIAL
DECISION-MAKING POWER AND AUTHORITY
Understanding the gravity of the discriminatory distribution of managerial
decision-making power is essential to recognizing managers’ need for a legal
remedy. Where female managers cannot resolve such discrimination through
internal workplace channels, their careers depend on a viable form of legal
redress. Part I.A explains several ways in which disparate managerial
decision-making power and authority manifest in the workplace. Part I.B
identifies possible causes behind this problem, which are necessary to
demonstrate at trial if a manager files a suit against her employer. Part I.C
highlights the value that alleviating this form of discrimination will have for
employers, the managers that experience inequity, and their subordinates.
A. Manifestations of the Problem
Imagine a woman who began working with her employer as a low-ranking
employee. She worked her way to a supervisory level and was later promoted
to a managerial role. She possesses years of experience and the requisite
education to wholly justify her promotions. Over time, however, she begins
to notice subtle but substantive differences between her authority and that of
her male colleagues in the same position. She consistently manages fewer
personnel and has decisional power over projects with less financial
importance.8 In fact, she manages a noticeably smaller proportion and less
financially impactful segment of the department’s budget. When she offers
her input on larger, more impactful financial decisions, nothing comes of it.
Her employer distributes work informally in an open market, yet she is never
able to assume her title’s power and authority to the same degree as many of
her male colleagues.9
To some, this is merely the way that their workplaces operate, and they see
nothing discriminatory about it. Rather, such decisional power distribution
is perceived as a consequence of the employer’s informal infrastructure,
which lacks objective evaluative metrics or a structured hierarchical chain of
command. But in fact, these processes reflect an ingrained discriminatory
8. See generally Alkadry et al., supra note 8 (presenting data showing that female city
managers direct a disproportionately smaller number of employees and oversee a smaller
portion of their agency’s budget than their male counterparts).
9. Power can be defined as “control over resources, people, and things,” and a manager’s
decision-making authority exercises that power. See James R. Elliott & Ryan A. Smith, Race,
Gender, and Workplace Power, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 365, 366 (2004).
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outlook. As Susan Sturm acknowledged in her piece, “Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,” “Structures of
decisionmaking, opportunity, and power fail to surface these patterns of
exclu[ding nondominant groups], and themselves produce differential access
and opportunity.”10 This differential access and opportunity, specifically
with regard to decisional processes, exist across all employment sectors, not
just corporate ones.11 Therefore, this Note does not focus solely on corporate
managers in its analysis.
One explanation for gender gaps in decisional power and authority is that
women are simply entering managerial roles that offer less authority than
other types of managerial positions.12 However, this Note addresses a very
particular circumstance in which there exists unequal gender-based
decisional authority between men and women holding the same role or rank.
Regardless of the decisional power and authority inherent across various
managerial positions, employers’ sex-based distribution of power among
those with the same position is legally impermissible.
B. Causes and Contributing Factors
Gender inequity in decision-making processes can manifest in a variety of
ways, and it follows that there are differing causes behind this problem. First,
employers’ inertia and their continuing “homosocial reproduction” are
interrelated causes behind the inequitable allocation of decisional power and
authority. Second, employers’ reliance on soft skills linked to sex or sex
stereotypes associated with a managerial role can contribute to the problem.
Third, employers’ unclear guidance or informal processes for distributing
decisional power can contribute to the gender disparity. Fourth, the temporal
order in which male and female managers exercise their power can cause and
even perpetuate the gender disparity. Finally, the opportunities that an
employer provides for managers to develop projects over which they will
exercise power can contribute to the problem.
Organizational inertia and homosocial reproduction, a pair of related
phenomena, are responsible for gender-disparate decision-making power.13
Until the late twentieth century, men maintained a virtual monopoly over
managerial roles, which was ascribed, to a great degree, by sex.14 Against
this historical backdrop, employers developed an untested assumption that
managerial roles are closely associated with male traits, and, in some cases,
“management was equated with masculinity.”15 Employers that do not
investigate or reform their distribution of managerial responsibilities
continue to adhere to the historical norms and assumptions, which are
10. Sturm, supra note 1, at 460 (emphasis added).
11. Elliott & Smith, supra note 9, at 366.
12. See Mintz & Krymkowski, supra note 7, at 38.
13. Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations’
Employment of Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 212 (2000).
14. Id. at 211.
15. Id.
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predisposed to favor men based on their sex.16 Employers’ inaction can be
conscious and protective.17 From their perspective, turning away from
historical norms may be considered a risky business decision because the
business’s management impacts productivity and profit.18 Continuing to
assign responsibilities to those who fit the traditional mold is deemed a safer
option because it offers employers predictability.19 Despite these seemingly
rational business calculations, employer inertia is irrational and
discriminatory when, by default, male managers are consistently allocated
more decisional power than their more capable female counterparts. Even in
instances where male managers are equally skilled or qualified, it remains
discriminatory for employers to unfailingly assume that one sex will
outperform the other.
Employers’ consistent predisposition towards male managers also reveals
a clear reliance on sex as a basis for power distribution, which is known as
homosocial reproduction.20 Employers continue to distribute power,
authority, and discretion to those that they identify as in-group members of
the workplace, which in the managerial context is most often white men.21
Data reflects that the percentage of women in an occupation contributes
negatively to the authority differential between men and women.22
Specifically, jobs comprised of fewer women reflect greater gender gaps in
authority. Even the education level between male and female managers does
not contribute to such a differential.23 Such data supports the theory of
homosocial reproduction as a contributing factor behind gender-disparate
decisional power.
Sex- or gender-linked stereotypical traits are a second cause of gender
inequity in managerial decision-making power. Specifically, the closer the
perceived relationship between a soft quality and a particular gender, the
more weight the evaluator will give to that quality.24 Women are often
associated with being more emotional and less objective decision-makers.25

16. Id. at 212–13.
17. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 192 (2008)
(discussing research which indicates that employers make “personnel investment[s]” in their
historical workforce populations, leaving them unwilling to accommodate newer, minority
workers).
18. Id.
19. See Reskin & McBrier, supra note 13, at 212. The authors discuss employer rationales
behind employers retaining more men in management jobs overall; however, the same
rationale applies to distributing actual power and authority away from men once women
assume the same managerial titles. Id.
20. Elliott & Smith, supra note 9, at 369.
21. See id.
22. See Mintz & Krymkowski, supra note 7, at 35.
23. Id. Men, however, do experience a greater return on their educational investment. Id.
at 23.
24. Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1051 (1991).
25. See generally THERESE HUSTON, HOW WOMEN DECIDE: WHAT’S TRUE, WHAT’S NOT,
AND WHAT STRATEGIES SPARK THE BEST CHOICES 29–40 (2016) (describing ways in which
women are considered to be inferior decision makers).
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Despite the research finding that men are in fact more eager to take risks and
act with less control in times of stress,26 both men and women tend to be
more skeptical of women’s decision-making skills.27 Research shows that
men are much more reactive when their decisions indicate a level of
achievement, which leads them to make more disadvantageous decisions.28
In contrast, women typically reflect more balanced decision-making because
their decision-making ability is less reactive to achievement stress.29
Specifically, women exhibit less mental disruption about their decisionmaking and perform better in stressful situations that test for achievement.30
Despite such findings, employers’ institutional reliance on stereotypes
contributes to gender inequity in decision-making processes.
Employers’ implicit gender bias can also be reflected in their professionaldevelopment training for managers in positions that are socially labeled as
masculine. Women in predominantly “male” manager roles are “often
regarded as less capable and are therefore denied access to the training
needed to succeed regardless of whether they comply with organizational
norms.”31 Unequal training can come in the form of a female manager’s
projects, which have comparatively lower financial importance or
complexity than to those of her male colleagues. Projects can offer managers
the opportunity to gain increased institutional knowledge and hone their
skills. When male managers are given decisional authority over substantive,
challenging, or significant projects, they can learn and professionally develop
more than their female counterparts. Emphasizing an employment position’s
social label as masculine or feminine can cause employers to perpetuate
gender inequity in decisional processes by professionally supporting some
managers more than others.
A third contributing factor is employers’ evaluation and work distribution
systems, which can amplify sex stereotypes and biases. Many workplaces
today have shifted away from the traditional, hierarchical management
structure and instead have adopted informal or even completely unstructured
processes to evaluate managers.32 Sex discrimination more likely exists
where the metrics used to review employees are vague or unclear.33 Vague
evaluative metrics cause the employer or persons reviewing managers to
26. See id. at 146–53; Ruud van den Bos et al., Stress and Decision-Making in Humans:
Performance Is Related to Cortisol Reactivity, Albeit Differently in Men and Women, 34
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1449, 1454–55 (2009) (explaining that men exhibit higher
cortisol levels when making decisions in stressful conditions, which makes them more
immediately sensitive to rewards than women in the same conditions).
27. See HUSTON, supra note 25, at 21.
28. E.g., van den Bos, supra note 26, at 1455.
29. Id.; see HUSTON, supra note 25, at 221–29.
30. See van den Bos, supra note 26, at 1454–55. The authors note that in their experiment,
men performed more poorly because of their focus on meeting a goal, whereas women
balanced the risks and benefits better to achieve higher performance. Id. at 1455.
31. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1111
(2014).
32. See Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace:
Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 639–40 (1998).
33. See Fiske et al., supra note 24, at 1050.
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instead rely on stereotypic metrics.34 As applied to decisional power, a less
systematic management regime might not offer an objective basis for
assigning managers to certain projects and subordinates.35 Informal
evaluations therefore also remove the assurance that all individuals in
decision-making positions are exercising their power equitably. Without
structured, objective metrics to abide by, evaluators’ underlying gender
biases towards particular groups are more likely to emerge and manifest in
assigning or reviewing decision-making power and authority.36 In the long
run, this means that employers’ implicit biases become a proxy for meritbased justifications behind the amount of decisional power that managers are
given.
Fourth, the temporal nature of managers’ decision-making power can
cement the gender imbalance based on employers’ self-fulfilling prophecies
about their abilities. Specifically, there may exist a “dogsled problem”
whereby women have decision-making powers over the preparation of a
project, yet lose or concede these powers to men on “race day,” or at the
zenith of a project.37 The sheer fact that some female managers will exercise
their decision-making authority prior to their male colleagues can cause it to
be considered inferior. Female managers will often strategically assemble
and direct subordinates to fulfill a project’s objective, but they are then forced
to defer to male managers when it comes time to present the project’s
conclusions to a client or to make the final, more public execution of the
project.38 In this instance, the sequence and appearance of the different
decision-making powers that men and women exhibit can lead employers,
and even the public, to form an implicit bias that the male decision makers
have executed all of the critical decisions.39 Moreover, placing men at the
forefront of final decisions gives credence to the notion that they deserve to
be rewarded with even greater decision-making powers in the future.40 Such
a conclusion can lead to a self-perpetuating cycle. Thus, the times at which
male and female managers exercise their decisional power and authority can
cause a substantial disparity in their perceived and actual decisional power
and authority.
Finally, the types of opportunities that certain managers are directed
toward can contribute to women holding unequal decision-making power in
the form of substantively inferior or lower-profile projects. By way of
illustration, some law firms provide male partners with more opportunities to
34. Id.
35. Id. (noting that “when [evaluative] information about [an employee] is ambiguous, it
is most open to interpretation” and that “subjective judgments of interpersonal skills and
collegiality are quite vulnerable to stereotypic biases”).”)”
36. See Sturm, supra note 32, at 665.
37. Kathy Caprino, How Decision-Making Is Different Between Men and Women and
Why It Matters in Business, FORBES (May 12, 2016, 10:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kathycaprino/2016/05/12/how-decision-making-is-different-between-men-and-womenand-why-it-matters-in-business/ [https://perma.cc/23UH-3ELJ].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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develop new business relationships while maintaining female “service
partners” who instead churn out the work.41 The ability to network for and
acquire new clients, cases, or projects represents opportunities for female
partners to collect and exercise great decision-making power. Although the
role of a law firm partner is not identical to a manager in other professions,
the underlying problem plaguing female partners at law firms is similar to
that facing female managers who must also network informally to obtain
projects that require substantive decisional power and authority. Without
employers allowing them an equal opportunity to network or investing equal
resources in their professional development, female managers cannot make
the connections necessary to augment their decision-making powers at the
same pace as their male colleagues.
Pinpointing the causes behind disparate levels of managerial decisionmaking power between men and women in a workplace is critical for an
individual seeking legal redress. Being able to identify, describe, and
substantiate the discriminatory employment practice resulting in the
inequitable level of decisional power helps a manager convince a jury or a
judge that her disparate treatment is based on systematic but subtle
discrimination.
C. Why Gender-Disparate Decision-Making Power Matters
Workplaces and employees stand to gain from removing discriminatory
barriers to managerial decision-making power. In addition to the job-specific
knowledge that female managers have, research has demonstrated that
certain traits more common in women can benefit workplaces. For example,
the level of social sensitivity in a group has been found to be a significant
predictor of its collective intelligence.42 Women are associated with higher
levels of social sensitivity than men.43 Thus, employers can foster more
productive group decision-making where they give women the equal
opportunity contribute meaningfully. This is just one way that female
managers can bring value and uniquely contribute to the productivity in their
workplaces.
From the employee perspective, disparate decisional power and authority
robs female managers of an equal status among their colleagues and the selfworth that comes with it. Employment “not only provides the means to live;
it also confers social status, dignity, and a sense of self.”44 Further, in the
most obvious sense, it is inherently unfair for an employee to work toward a
management position and ultimately find herself unable to exercise the
decisional authority associated with her job because of her sex. The gender
41. Elizabeth Olson, Lawsuit Presses the Issue of Lower Pay for Female Law Partners,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/business/
dealbook/law-firm-pay-gender-bias.html [https://perma.cc/5QA9-5YEV].
42. See Anita Williams Woolley et al., Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in
the Performance of Human Groups, 330 SCIENCE 686, 688 (2010).
43. Id.
44. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1005–06.
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gap also sets an unfair precedent that limits future female managers from
exercising the power inherently associated with their positions.
In addition to concerns about dignity and fairness, the manager’s material
earnings and career trajectories are also jeopardized. If a manager has been
given lesser decisional power over a long period of time, her pay is unlikely
to remain at parity with her male colleagues who have been given greater
decisional power. Therefore, her salary trajectory will be diminished from
years of not being given the power, and therefore not being able to
demonstrate her ability, to make high-level decisions.
Gender inequity in managerial decision-making power is a unique and
important problem stemming from a diversity of causes. It leaves female
managers in a unique position where they appear to have cracked the glass
ceiling but continue to face an infrastructural barrier that limits their career,
pay, and dignity. Female managers can and should utilize the most
appropriate resource to break the glass walls they face: the law.
II. A BACKGROUND IN GENDER IMBALANCED DECISION-MAKING
POWER AND SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW
Following a foundational understanding of gender inequity in managerial
decisional power and authority, this Part lays out the legal framework
pertinent to this problem. Specifically, Part II explains employment
discrimination law and its appropriateness as a remedy for managers. Part
II.A explains why managers require a legal remedy to this problem rather
than pursuing alternative measures. Part II.B introduces employment
discrimination law and its evolution and concludes with an overview of
where the law stands today. Part II.C describes the various procedural
requirements that a potential claimant must meet in order to file a viable
lawsuit. Part II.D first illustrates a different legal theory that a claimant can
pursue as part of her suit and the practical mechanics behind that theory. It
then offers a brief overview of the remedies available to a successful
claimant.
A. Why the Law Must Address This Problem
A growing number of scholars contend that seeking legal redress for
implicit forms of employment discrimination, such as unequal decisionmaking power, is not promising.45 However, this Note disagrees with that
perspective because the alternative is to rely on employers undertaking their

45. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times:
Can New Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?,
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 323–25 (2007).
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own reforms. Even with increased research46 and journalism47 that addresses
the fault in labeling jobs by sex- or gender-based traits, employers continue
to rely on implicit biases and stereotypes.48 Any employer initiative would
need to come from a group of high-level decision makers in the workplace—
the same group perpetuating the discrimination at issue. It is unlikely that
change will actually arise internally. Instead, an external force, such as the
law, is required for employers to become incentivized to recognize and
actively root out the subtle, impactful sex discrimination in their workplaces.
Seeking a legal remedy to gender inequity in the decision-making
processes is important for both the individuals directly impacted by the
inequity as well as for their coworkers. Employees perceive their workplace
to be more diverse when they see female leaders.49 The diversity of gender
among managers also has the potential to affect personnel policies such as
hiring and compensation.50 Yet if female managers cannot exercise the
decisional power that is expected to correlate with their positions, then
having more women in these roles is essentially meaningless. Moreover,
managers who face inequitable decision-making power will not stay long
with their employer; rather, they will seek opportunities in equitable
workplaces.51 Even if these managers leave and are replaced by other female
managers, the same possibility of attrition remains.
Gender inequity in managerial decision-making processes simultaneously
causes employees to face culturally incompetent human resources (HR)
policies. When decision-making bodies are nominally diverse but practically
homogenous, the programs and policies they create will reflect closed-group
thinking.52 Managerial decisions impact employees’ lives in material ways.
By offering only one managerial group’s view of healthcare, childcare, job
protection, and other job-related benefits, employers may end up presenting

46. See, e.g., id.; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1200 (1995); Reskin & McBrier, supra note 13, at 210.
47. See, e.g., Stav Ziv, Male and Female Co-Workers Switched Email Signatures, Faced
Sexism, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 10, 2017, 4:34 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/male-and-femalecoworkers-switched-email-signatures-faced-sexism-566507 [https://perma.cc/5GV4-46MF].
48. Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 408–09 (2003) (“Managers themselves described successful women
managers as more competent, active, and potent than women as a whole; however, these same
managers described women managers as ‘decidedly more deficient’ in these qualities than
their male counterparts.”).
49. Cailin S. Stamarski & Leanne S. Son Hing, Gender Inequalities in the Workplace:
The Effects of Organizational Structures, Processes, Practices, and Decision Makers’ Sexism,
6 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL., Sept. 2015, at 1, 6.
50. Reskin & McBrier, supra note 13, at 211.
51. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1062 (explaining that even employers’ seemingly
neutral methods for executing gender-biased employment decisions can drive women away
from their high-ranking jobs or the workforce entirely).
52. See Stamarski & Hing, supra note 49, at 3 (“HR-related decision-making occurs when
organizational decision makers (i.e., managers, supervisors, or HR personnel) employ HR
policy to determine how it will be applied to a particular situation and individual.”).
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insufficient or limited HR support to their employees.53 It is unrealistic to
expect that the same decision-making bodies that need to be reformed will
implement policies to ensure that its members are given truly equal decisionmaking power. That is why this Note explores the viability and effect that
litigation can have in response to gender-disparate managerial decision
making.
B. A Brief History and Evolution of Sex Discrimination Law
Two employment laws largely form the basis for sex-based discrimination
litigation: (1) the Equal Pay Act and (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Equal Pay Act pertains to employees’ compensation—not other
practices in a workplace, such as unequal decision-making power—and is
therefore inapplicable to this Note.54 Title VII, on the other hand, offers
promising legal redress for novel causes of action. This statute prohibits
employment practices that discriminate against employees on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.55 Further, it protects employees
who are both experiencing discrimination and openly opposing it.56
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that Title VII is meant
to remove arbitrary barriers to “professional development that ha[ve]
historically been encountered by women and . . . other minorities.”57
Importantly, later legislative history, discussing the need to amend Title VII,
indicates that Congress understood employment discrimination law to extend
beyond “intentional wrongs” and to address complex infrastructural
problems.58
This Note focuses exclusively on Title VII as a remedy for unequal
decision-making power among managers. Courts have recognized Title VII
sex discrimination claims arising from a variety of discriminatory
employment practices, including job assignments, transfers, promotions,
prerequisite tests for employment, and hiring practices.59 Title VII’s
application to employee assignments and transfers reflects the statute’s broad
prohibition on employment practices unassociated with compensation or

53. See id. at 3–4.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
56. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013) (explaining
that Title VII protects employees who oppose discriminatory employment practices or file a
complaint alleging employment discrimination).
57. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (explaining the purpose behind Title
VII).
58. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 5 (1971). The report on this proposed amendment to Title VII
stated, “Employment discrimination as viewed today is a . . . complex and pervasive
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms
of ‘systems’ and ‘effects’ rather than simply intentional wrongs . . . .” Id.
59. See generally Russell Specter & Paul J. Spiegelman, Annotation, Employment
Discrimination Action Under Federal Civil Rights Acts, 21 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (2017) (providing
examples of various sex discrimination cases).
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other material awards to employees.60 Analogously, managerial decisional
power is not immediately associated with compensation or other material
reward, but rather a difference in job conditions. Although disputes over
distributing unequal managerial decision-making power have not made their
way to the courts, Title VII contains two provisions in support of such a
claim. Each of these provisions is analyzed in greater detail in Part III.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees
on certain bases. The two relevant provisions of the statute make it unlawful
for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.61

Congress’s inclusion of the term “sex” as a basis for Title VII
discrimination was a late amendment to the statute but should be granted
equal importance to the other bases.62 Representative Howard Smith
proposed the term in an amendment two days before the bill passed the
House, stating that it would help white women to compete for employment
against prospective African American female candidates.63 This opinion was
not unique. Representative Martha Griffiths also relied on a race-based
rationale to justify the prohibition of sex-based discrimination in the bill.64
Although there is no official record of the individual votes for the
amendment, it is understood that its support largely derived from
Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress.65 This same coalition of
congressmen disfavored civil rights for African Americans.66 It is widely
believed that some of the amendment’s proponents intended to use the
amendment to defeat the bill’s passage in Congress.67 Other legislators
60. See generally Daniel M. Le Vay, Annotation, Sex Discrimination in Job Assignment
or Transfer as Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 123 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2011)
(collecting cases of unlawful employment practices).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
62. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1014–15.
63. See 110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith). Despite his stated position,
Smith’s proposal is thought to have been intended to quash the bill. See Schultz, supra note
31, at 1014–16. In fact, Smith did not vote for the amended bill’s passage through the House.
110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964).
64. See CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES,
1945–1968, at 179 (1988).
65. See Katherine Krimmel, Rights by Fortune or Fight? Re-Examining the Addition of
Sex to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 2 (Jan 17, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
66. Id.
67. See id. (manuscript at 6, 11).
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voiced concerns about the potentially harmful ramifications of the bill’s
broadened scope, with the inclusion of amendments such as sex-based
discrimination.68
Given the amendment’s late inclusion in the bill, the conventional
interpretation is that the legislative history does not reflect a coherent
legislative intent to combat sex discrimination.69 Yet, some congressional
intent to make sex a meaningful component of the bill can be gleaned from
the multiple opportunities that congressmen had, but did not take, to remove
the term “sex.”70 One scholar argues that, in fact, some members of Congress
possessed political will to include sex as a status protected from
discrimination.71 In the decades preceding the proposal of the sex
discrimination amendment, feminist coalitions so consistently—and it seems
effectively—advocated for such statutory reform that the Republican and
Southern Democratic electorates eventually reflected an inclination to afford
greater legal rights to women by the mid-twentieth century.72 Therefore, the
conventional wisdom that there was not a true congressional intent behind
the inclusion of sex-based discrimination in Title VII, or that it was nothing
more than a tactic to defeat the bill, does not convey the whole story. Besides
reflecting political willpower to enhance legal protections for women, the
plain statutory language requires that sex discrimination be afforded the same
seriousness as Title VII’s other bases for discrimination.
Soon after Title VII’s passage, sex discrimination did not receive much
priority. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) officials
tasked with furthering Title VII’s implementation initially considered sexbased discrimination to be unimportant.73 The first successful cases delving
into sex-based discrimination claims rested on applying the statute’s plain
meaning to the most obvious instances of discrimination. For instance, the
Supreme Court held that an employer violated Title VII where it accepted
only male applicants with preschool children without considering female
applicants with children.74 Sexual harassment claims, however, were not
initially regarded as an obvious form of sex discrimination. They posed
greater difficulty for plaintiffs because courts could not rely on legislative
history to determine whether the alleged misconduct was within the statute’s
scope.75 As demonstrated by early case law, the courts were reluctant to
68. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (asking the Committee to “[i]magine the upheaval that would result
from adoption of blanket language requiring total equality”).
69. See Krimmel, supra note 65 (manuscript at 2).
70. Id. (manuscript at 3).
71. Id. (manuscript at 2).
72. Id.
73. Multiple EEOC directors conveyed that sex discrimination was a lesser concern for
the agency and voiced an intent to avoid becoming known as the “sex commission.” See
HARRISON, supra note 64, at 187–89.
74. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
75. See Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975)
(distinguishing Title VII’s purpose, based on judicial interpretations of its legislative history,
from a remedy to sexual harassment), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Barnes
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apply the statute beyond instances of plain violations. The first district courts
to review this issue in the late 1970s denied sexual harassment claims, and
they did not recognize unwanted sexual advances in the workplace as
inextricably sex-based.76 The courts reasoned that Title VII did not apply to
a plaintiff faced with sexual harassment because the treatment she received
was prompted by her decision to reject her supervisor’s advances against her
and not on her sex.77 Ultimately, many of these district courts were reversed
years later by their circuit courts, which recognized that the sexual advances
that plaintiffs faced were prompted by their sex as females.78
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins79 expanded
its interpretation of sex-based discrimination to include an employer’s
reliance on sex stereotypes to deny a promotion to a female employee.80 In
Price Waterhouse, the Court held that disparate treatment based on sex exists
where an employer expects female employees to conform to behavioral
stereotypes, such as speaking “more femininely” or wearing makeup.81
Importantly, the Court interpreted Title VII’s language to “mean that gender
must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”82 By going beyond the word
“sex” and including the term “gender” in Title VII’s purview, the Court
recognized that the statute applied to societally constructed roles for each
sex. In doing so, the Court expanded Title VII’s scope beyond a mere
biological distinction of sex and recognized that it encompasses social
expectations of sex, too.83
Nearly a decade later, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.84 reiterated a broad conception of Title VII. Acknowledging that the
statute’s application does not end with the “principal evil” that the legislature
intended to dissolve at the time of the statute’s enactment, the Court

v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986–87 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Unfortunately, the early history of [Title
VII] lends no assistance to endeavors to define the scope of [sex discrimination] more
precisely, if indeed any elucidation were needed.”). The Barnes court ultimately found the
Title VII applied to sexual harassment but it did so on the basis of legislative clarifications
about Title VII in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Supreme Court’s
progressive interpretation of the statute in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971), and its fellow circuit courts’ application of Title VII to a variety of sex-based barriers
in the workplace. Id. at 987.
76. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal.
1976), rev’d, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 1974 WL 10628
(D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
77. See, e.g., Barnes, 1974 WL 10628, at *1 (“The substance of plaintiff’s complaint is
that she was discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to
engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor. This is a controversy underpinned by the
subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship.”).
78. See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989.
79. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
80. Id. at 250–51.
81. Id. at 235.
82. Id. at 240.
83. See id. at 244 (finding that “an employer may not take gender into account”).
84. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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recognized that the law extends to “reasonably comparable evils.”85 Thus, it
is fitting to include gender inequity in decisional processes as actionable
under Title VII because it is a comparable evil to the more obvious
discriminatory practices, and it is rooted in impermissible employer policies
such as sex stereotyping.
C. Qualifications for Bringing a Title VII Claim
In addition to understanding Title VII’s statutory history and evolution, it
is important to address the basic procedural requirements for litigants to bring
a viable suit under this statute. Title VII does not apply to all employment
relationships and practices. To qualify as an “employer” under Title VII, the
person or business entity must be in an industry affecting commerce.86
Further, the employer must employ fifteen or more persons for each working
day in each of twenty or more weeks in the current or previous year.87 An
employee is anyone employed by such an employer, with the exception of
individuals holding state or local public office, or their personal staff or
policy advisors.88
Employment discrimination suits may be brought by the EEOC,89 the
Attorney General behalf of the United States in alleged “pattern-or-practice”
discrimination cases,90 or by a private party.91 A charging party must file its
claim with the EEOC within 180 days, or about six months, following the
alleged unlawful employment practice’s occurrence.92 The EEOC must act
upon cases within a limited statutory period.93 If the agency fails to review
cases expeditiously, it must notify the charging party, which then has ninety
days to file the action in district court.94 If a charging party experiences
additional events that appear discriminatory, the EEOC may amend the
original complaint or require that the charging party file another claim
altogether if the events do not overlap with the existing claim.95
The EEOC does not have the authority to adjudicate all employment
disputes on its own. With respect to nonfederal employers, the agency uses
its statutory powers to obtain compliance for an employee in the federal

85. Id. at 75 (applying Title VII to sexual harassment in the form of physical assaults and
threats of rape towards a heterosexual male from his other male coworkers).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
90. Id. § 2000e-6(a).
91. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
92. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
93. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
94. Id.
95. See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/UK5F-A9SA]
(last visited Aug. 24, 2018); see also, e.g., Bayless v. Ancilla Domini Coll., 781 F. Supp. 2d
740, 764 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
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courts.96 For disputes involving federal employers, the EEOC participates in
the adjudicatory process.97 After a federal employee files a discrimination
complaint and receives a post-investigation notice from the EEOC, the
employee may either request a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge
or request that the federal employer issue a decision over the matter.98 If an
employee-claimant pursues a hearing, the judge will ultimately issue a
decision and order relief where it is warranted.99 If the decision favors the
employee-claimant, the federal employer may still issue its own order
rejecting the judge’s decision.100 In this event, the federal employee may file
an appeal with the EEOC and file a civil action in federal district court.101
Beyond these procedural steps, a successful plaintiff must satisfy the
substantive requirements for an employment discrimination suit as explained
in the following section.
D. Types of Discrimination Suits
Under Title VII, an employee may establish an unlawful employment
practice through one of two legal theories: disparate treatment or disparate
impact. This section presents the prima facie requirements for each theory
of discrimination as well as plaintiffs’ strategies for successful litigation.
1. Disparate Treatment Theory
Disparate treatment theory concerns employment practices demonstrating
intentional discrimination, or conduct that is unexplainable by any cause
other than discrimination, toward an employee based on a protected status
such as sex.102 All disparate treatment claims are subject to the burdenshifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.103
The framework functions in three steps: (1) the employee-plaintiff’s prima
facie burden; (2) the employer’s rebuttal; and (3) the employee-plaintiff’s
response.
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. To
do so, the plaintiff must “demonstrate the following: (1) she was within the
protected [Title VII] class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was

96. Tracy Bateman Farrell et al., Annotation, Introduction to the Equal Opportunity
Commission, 21 Fed. Proc. Law. Edition § 50:1 (2008).
97. Hearings, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/
federal/fed_employees/hearing.cfm [https://perma.cc/9DKD-NLAB] (last visited Aug. 24,
2018).
98. Filing a Formal Complaint, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/filing_complaint.cfm [https://perma.cc/3VPEHMVW] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Sturm, supra note 1, at 473 & n.45.
103. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”104
The first three prongs of a prima facie case are fairly straightforward. The
fourth and final prong requires the plaintiff to link the employment practice
with discrimination. If the plaintiff seeks to establish that the adverse
employment action was centrally motivated by an impermissible purpose,
she can refer to those similarly situated to her to demonstrate differential
treatment.105 She may use also statistical data, similar to that used by class
action plaintiffs, to support an inference of intentional discrimination.106 By
way of illustration, the Supreme Court has compared a class’s representation
and treatment in a given workplace to the class’s existence in the relevant
labor market.107 Geography and the job itself will define the parameters of
the “relevant labor market.”108 Similarly, individuals claiming intentional
discrimination may use statistical evidence to establish the employer’s
subjective intent to treat them differently based on a protected, minority
status.109
In the absence of a single, direct causal link between the employee’s
minority status and the employer’s differential treatment, a plaintiff can still
establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim through a mixed-motive
test.110 Under this analysis, the employee need not establish that the
discriminatory motive was the sole or primary motive behind the employer’s
conduct.111 A plaintiff may sufficiently make a claim by establishing that
the employee’s protected status was a substantial motivating factor behind
the employment practice.112 The mixed-motive test interprets the statutory
language, “because of . . . sex,” as having a broader application than was
earlier interpreted.113 The previous interpretation held that “because of”
meant that “but for” the employee’s protected status, the employer would not
have acted in the way it did.114 The current analysis allows employees to
104. Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 (2d Cir. 2009); accord McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04.
105. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN
THEORY AND DOCTRINE 38 (3d ed. 2010).
106. Id. at 58.
107. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977) (explaining that
statistics can be an important source of proof in employment discrimination cases, and gross
statistical differences can even establish prima facie proof of discrimination).
108. Id. at 308.
109. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 58.
110. Id. A mixed-motive test does not extend to retaliation or ADEA claims. See, e.g.,
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (finding that the motivatingfactor test did not extend to Title VII retaliation claims); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S.
167, 170 (2009) (finding that the motivating-factor test did not apply to ADEA claims).
111. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 58.
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,
an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”). This reasoning was first
introduced in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
113. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 58–59.
114. Id.
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establish liability where the employer had both legal and illegal motives, and
the latter was a factor in the employer’s decision to discriminate against the
employee.115 In a mixed-motive claim, the court can award attorney’s fees,
as well as injunctive and declaratory remedies.116
Second, the burden shifts to the employer if the employee successfully
meet its prima facie burden.117 The employer must then establish that it had
a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the employment practice in
question.118 Specifically, where an employee’s sex is a “bona fide
occupational qualification” for the job and that qualification is reasonably
necessary for regular business operations, the employer is not acting
unlawfully.119 If the employer fails to rebut the discrimination charge, the
employee prevails.
Finally, the burden shifts back to the employee-plaintiff if the employer
establishes sex as a legitimate occupational qualification.120 The employee
is “given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence
that the presumptively valid reasons for [the employment action] were in fact
a coverup for a . . . discriminatory decision.”121 A successful plaintiff must
establish this by a preponderance of the evidence.122 If the plaintiff
successfully rebuts the employer’s proposed defense as mere pretext for
discriminatory practices, the case enters the remedy stage. When a case
reaches the remedy stage, the employer assumes the burden of persuasion
regarding how much it owes the plaintiff in damages.123
To escape a robust award to the plaintiff, an employer can avail itself of
an affirmative defense that it would have taken the same action against the
plaintiff notwithstanding its proven discriminatory motivating factor.124 In
doing so, the employer can dodge substantive liability, leaving only the
payment for opposing party’s attorney’s fees and costs.125 However, if the
employer fails to establish such an affirmative defense, the court may “award
any type of Title VII relief.”126
Ultimately, a plaintiff can prevail and seek remedy regardless of whether
the protected status, such as sex, was the employer’s central motivation or
one of many motivations behind its unfavorable employment practices. As
Part III will discuss in greater detail, disparate treatment theory provides
115. Frederick K. Grittner, Annotation, Mixed Motives, 9 West’s Fed. Admin. Prac.
§ 11391 (Supp. 2017).
116. Id.
117. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).
118. Id.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
120. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 803.
121. Id. at 804–05.
122. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 48.
123. Id.
124. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94–95 (2003).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2012). However, some courts have interpreted the
statute to use permissive rather than mandatory language with respect to awarding fees. See,
e.g., Canup v. Chipman-Union Inc., 123 F.3d 1440, 1442 (11th Cir. 1997).
126. Grittner, supra note 115.
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relief for an employee where her employer consciously or unconsciously
excludes her from employment opportunities.127
2. Disparate Impact Theory
Disparate impact theory addresses facially neutral employment practices
that cause a significant discriminatory impact.128 This section presents a
brief history of disparate impact theory as well as its evolution in meaning
and import in Title VII jurisprudence. Thereafter, the section lays out the
theory’s mechanics and its value to plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact theory in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.129 In Griggs, the Court recognized a Title VII cause of
action against a facially neutral employment practice that produced a
disparate effect on a protected minority class and that was not justified by a
business necessity.130 Nearly two decades later, however, the Court in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio131 narrowed the applicability of disparate impact
theory by increasing the onus on plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie
case. In Wards Cove, the Court found that an imbalance in race or some other
minority status among employees is, in and of itself, insufficient to establish
a prima facie case for disparate impact.132 Rather, the Court in Wards Cove
set a requirement that plaintiffs must prove: (1) that there is a disparity
between the proportion of a minority class in an occupation and the
proportion of that minority class in the labor market for that occupation;133
and (2) that a particular employment practice caused this disparity.134
Additionally, the Court held that the burden remained with the plaintiffs
through the course of litigation, meaning they would need to disprove a
defendant’s proposed business-necessity defense, regardless of its
validity.135 Consequently, under Wards Cove, only a narrow subset of
claimant cases would be viable.136
In response to the Court’s decision, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which appeared to partially broaden a disparate impact claim’s
scope back to pre-Wards Cove levels.137 One section of the Act expressly
127. See infra Part III.
128. See Sturm, supra note 1, at 467 & n.21.
129. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
130. Id. at 431 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”).
131. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
132. See generally id.
133. Id. at 652–54.
134. Id. at 656. With this additional requirement, Wards Cove went beyond Hazelwood’s
requirement of statistical evidence on the labor market.
135. Id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1099 & n.556.
137. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2012)) (“The demonstration referred
to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989,
with respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’”). In this section, Congress
sought to apply a section of Title VII as it was interpreted the day before the Court set forth
its Wards Cove opinion.
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indicated in its legislative history that the discrimination law pertaining to
causation was to return to the pre-Wards Cove legal doctrine.138 Specifically,
this legislation effectively reversed the Wards Cove requirement that
plaintiffs must bear the burden of persuasion throughout a case. Instead,
employers are required to propose a business-necessity defense, and they
must prove that defense’s validity for it to be considered.139 A plaintiff is
therefore no longer required to rebut a business-necessity defense that is
invalid. The Act also permits plaintiffs to argue that certain complex
employment practices should be reviewed as a single employment process
rather than as individual elements.140 The Act did not completely reject the
Court’s decision in Wards Cove, but it did codify the plaintiff’s burden to
identify the particular employment practice causing the alleged disparate
impact.141 The Act did not clarify the necessary elements for establishing a
disparate impact finding.142 Neither the Court nor Congress has clarified
exactly how to establish such a claim besides using statistical support to show
disparate impact.143
Following the Act’s passage in 1991, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano144
still maintained a narrow interpretation of disparate impact claims. In Ricci,
the Court reviewed a mandatory aptitude test for any New Haven firefighter
seeking promotion.145 Some critics of the test alleged that it was
discriminatory because white firefighters were projected to be the test’s
predominant beneficiaries, and the few minority firefighters still had a
relatively low chance of receiving the promotion.146 In response, the city of
New Haven did not certify the test or its results.147
A class of firefighters who stood to gain promotion from the test results
sued the city.148 The Court held that New Haven’s refusal to certify the test
was intentional reverse discrimination, reasoning that the city’s failure to
certify would have been justified only if it was responding to a legitimate

138. See id. § 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2012)) (“No
statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional
Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied
upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that
relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.”).
139. Id. § 104, 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (defining “demonstrates”
as “meets the burdens of production and persuasion” where the employer “demonstrates” a
business necessity defense).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2012). The plaintiff must establish that the
employment process cannot be separated into elements. Id.
141. Id.; see also RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 77.
142. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 80–81.
143. One scholar notes that partly because both disparate treatment and disparate impact
claims can rely on statistical data, plaintiffs do not have any clear instruction for precisely
what more they must prove for the latter claim. Id. at 81.
144. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
145. Id. at 571.
146. Id. at 562.
147. Id.
148. Id. 562–63.
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disparate impact claim.149 The Court concluded that minority firefighters
would not been successful if they brought a disparate impact claim in
response to the certified test, and it therefore dismissed the possibility of the
city facing a legitimate disparate impact claim.150 The Court’s decision in
Ricci effectively hinders well-meaning employers’ abilities to defend against
reverse discrimination claims, while strengthening all employers’ abilities to
ward off disparate impact claims.151 Further, it affirms the burden on
plaintiffs to propose an alternative practice that the employer could have
pursued to meet its legitimate business needs while having a smaller disparate
impact.152 Thus, while disparate impact theory once permitted a wide
breadth of suits, the Court has increasingly narrowed the theory’s
applicability and expanded the plaintiff’s obligations in making a successful
case.
Currently, to establish a prima facie claim, an employee must first establish
that the employment practice or policy has an unequal impact on a protected
class.153 To defend against liability, the employer must then successfully
establish that it is acting due to a business need in question and that the
challenged practice relates to the job position.154 Only if an employer’s
business-necessity defense is valid must an employee establish that the
proposed justification is pretext for discrimination.155
While disparate impact litigation once provided employees with a vehicle
to remedy the subtle discriminatory practices or infrastructure in their
workplaces, the recent litigation over this theory indicates its diminishing
force. With increased burdens on the plaintiff, such as presenting an
alternative feasible employment practice, disparate impact theory produces
many hurdles for litigants.
E. Litigation Remedies
Title VII’s remedial framework is set up so that a successful charging party
can be “placed, as near as may be, in the situation [s]he would have occupied
if the wrong had not been committed.”156 In cases where an employer’s
149. Id. at 585 (“[B]efore an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the
asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer
must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact
liability . . . .”).
150. Id. at 587–90.
151. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 91. The Court’s holding that New Haven
unjustifiably discriminated against white firefighters based on race for recognizing that its
tests produced a negative impact on minority firefighters reflects a reasoning wedded to Wards
Cove rather than the subsequent Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr.,
Reading Amendments and Expansions of Title VII Narrowly, 95 B.U. L. REV. 781, 793 (2015).
152. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) (2012)).
153. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). Employers cannot, however, use the
business-necessity defense against a disparate treatment claim that alleges that they are
intentionally discriminating. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
154. Id.
155. Teal, 457 U.S. at 447.
156. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1975) (quoting Wicker v.
Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)).
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single motive was to discriminate against an employee, the remedy can
include both injunctive and monetary relief.157 Injunctive relief can “include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”158
However in the context of a mixed-motive case, if an employer proves that it
would have committed the same employment practice even without its
discriminatory motivation, the employee cannot recover damages beyond
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or attorney’s fees and costs.159
Monetary relief usually takes the form of compensatory damages, which
serve to make the plaintiff whole.160 In discrimination cases involving
federal employers, an additional set of remedies is available, including an
unconditional offer to place employees where they ought to have been placed
and a commitment by the employer to take preventative measures in the
future.161 Federal employees who are discriminated against in ways that
cannot be remedied with job promotion or placement are owed a “full
opportunity to participate in the employee benefit denied.”162
In its 1991 amendment to Title VII, Congress introduced the availability
of punitive damages against nongovernmental employers in disparate
treatment, but not disparate impact, cases.163 However, the Supreme Court
interpreted this amendment narrowly and made such damages available only
on the basis of employer intent. An employer who discriminated against
employees without perceiving even the risk of violating federal law, or who
acted with a “distinct belief that its discrimination [was] lawful,” is exempt
from punitive damages.164 Further, the employer is not vicariously
responsible by way of punitive damages for discriminatory actions by its
managerial agents.165
The remedies available from a Title VII claim can impact an individual’s
choice of discrimination theory as well as her decision to litigate at all. The
ensuing analysis delves into determining which legal theory is the most
promising for a potential plaintiff.
III. A PIONEERING SEX DISCRIMINATION SUIT: TITLE VII LEGAL
THEORIES APPLIED TO GENDER INEQUITY IN DECISION-MAKING
While both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims could
theoretically provide recourse for a manager facing inequitable decisional
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(B).
160. Id. § 2000e-5(g). The language of the statute reflects an intent to isolate the available
remedies for Title VII to only equitable relief. Id. The subsection lists equitable forms of relief
for a prevailing charging party followed by the phrase “or any other equitable relief.” Id. This
broad final phrase can be read to characterize other actions listed.
161. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a) (2017).
162. See id. § 1614.501(c)(5).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)–(b)(1) (2012). Congress has not enacted additional
amendments since 1991.
164. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536–37 (1999).
165. Id. at 545.
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power, they each present unique hurdles. This Part will explore how a
potential plaintiff can approach litigation under either theory to seek relief
from gender inequity in decisional processes. Part III.A presents the
preliminary arguments and statutory interpretation necessary to litigants
preparing an employment discrimination case. Part III.B analyzes how a
litigant would approach a disparate treatment suit and the hurdles she would
face. Part III.C analyzes how a litigant would fare in a disparate impact suit
tackling the same statutory provisions. Finally, this Part concludes that
disparate treatment theory offers a more promising path because the risks a
plaintiff faces can be outweighed by the benefits leading to a successful
claim.
A. Preliminary Considerations for Sex Discrimination Suits
A manager given disparate decisional power can obtain forceful and longlasting relief by utilizing the law. Although litigation of this exact nature has
not yet entered state or federal courts,166 Title VII offers both a viable and
promising resolution to the problem at hand.
Two provisions in Title VII exist to provide redress to managers for
disparate decision-making power and authority.167 The first concerns
whether an employee faces discriminatory terms and conditions during her
employment; the second concerns whether an employee is limited or
classified in a way that adversely affects her employment.168 As an initial
matter, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that novel Title VII actions can
arise from interpretations of each provision in the statute.169 The Court has
cautioned that employment practices or procedures that present “built-in
headwinds” for minority groups are prohibited.170 Moreover, the guidelines
by which the EEOC reviews sex-based discrimination claims permits the
agency to address new issues in that arena.171 By acknowledging that the
agency may continue to review problems relating to sex discrimination on a
case-by-case basis, the guidelines leave room to bring long-existing
discriminatory employment practices into court.172 Sexual harassment
claims serve as a paradigmatic example of Title VII’s evolving interpretation
beyond obvious applications of the statute.
While Title VII does not expressly include a sexual harassment claim,
lawyers and activists utilized Catharine MacKinnon’s scholarship, which
166. See supra Introduction.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); see supra Part II.A.
168. See supra Part II.D.
169. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447–48 (1982) (“Title VII [is directed
toward] ‘the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment’ and
professional development that had historically been encountered by women . . . .” (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))).
170. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (describing Congress’s intent behind Title VII’s application
as focused on an employment practice’s consequences, and not merely the employer’s
motivation).
171. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (2017).
172. Id.
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interpreted sexual harassment as a form of sex-based discrimination, to
prevail in litigation.173 This established sexual harassment as an unlawful
employment practice.174 In the same vein, it is possible to establish novel
causes of action against employers whose practices of distributing decisional
power permit or encourage gender-inequitable decision-making power and
authority.
The first pertinent provision of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer
“to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of her sex.175 To
apply this provision, a plaintiff must first understand what “terms” and
“conditions” mean. Although Title VII does not define “terms and
conditions,” the statute provides certain examples in the employment
context: “grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, [and] hours.”176
Additionally, litigation pertaining to “hiring, firing, pay, job assignments,
promotions, layoff, training, fringe benefits” has been considered to fall
within the terms and conditions of employment.177 Job transfers based on
sex are also discriminatory.178 The Court has held that terms and conditions
apply to both contractual provisions and “‘the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women’ in employment.”179 With these considerations
in mind, the next section focuses on disparate treatment theory as applied to
gender-inequitable decision-making processes and the hurdles this theory
poses.
B. Pursuing a Disparate Treatment Lawsuit
A novel disparate treatment claim for unequal decision-making powers is
cognizable based on Title VII precedent. The Court has understood the
phrase “because of . . . sex” to include sex stereotyping (i.e., expecting men
and women to match the social constructs created for their respective
genders).180 The Court has taken a broad reading of the legislative intent
behind the text prohibiting sex-based discrimination.181 More recently, the
Court has further recognized that Title VII extends to “reasonably
comparable evils” beyond those that Congress originally intended to
173. Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS
1, 9 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
174. Id.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
176. Id. § 2000e(d).
177. Sex-Based Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm [https://perma.cc/2PTE-F4H5] (last visited Aug.
24, 2018).
178. See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1980).
179. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
180. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989).
181. Id. at 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for . . .
‘Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13)).
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
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eradicate with Title VII.182 Accordingly, an employee-plaintiff can establish
a disparate treatment claim by showing that her employer was motivated by
sex stereotyping.183 The employee-plaintiff may also establish that other
causes behind gender inequity in decisional processes184 are sex or gender
based.
From a manager’s perspective, decision-making power and authority can
exist within two categories of job terms and conditions: (1) those which are
expressly found in work contracts, and (2) those which are presumed to be
associated with the job title. Decision-making power may be explicit from a
manager’s written responsibilities, but such authority is also implied in
managerial duties. Recognized terms and conditions, such as job
assignments and transfers, concern whether an employer changes its
employees’ substantive duties. Decision-making power similarly affects
managers’ substantive duties since it reflects their day-to-day
responsibilities.
“The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed.”185 Distributing decisional
power based on gender stereotypes about a female manager’s personality
traits,186 assumptions about her sex and race,187 or her socially defined
responsibilities outside of work188 can all be construed as sex discrimination.
Arguably, it is an implicit term of a manager’s position that she has an
equitable share of the incremental decision-making powers that her
colleagues of the same rank and title obtain. Therefore, an employee-plaintiff
may argue that inequitable distribution of power and authority between sexes
is a disadvantageous term for her.
Without equal decisional power or authority, female managers stand to
lose any future claims of discrimination based on the earlier discriminatory
distribution of power. Particularly, continued gender disparity in decisional
power can begin to justify an employer’s future unequal distribution in
decision-making.189 For example, if male managers are given early
opportunity to wield decisional power and do so in a productive manner, then
they are more likely to be considered for additional opportunities in the
182. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed.”).
183. See supra Part I (describing sex stereotyping as one potential cause behind gender
inequity in decisional processes).
184. See supra Part I.
185. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
186. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; see also supra Part I.
187. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir.
1980) (recognizing black females collectively as “a distinct protected subgroup” under Title
VII); see also supra Part I.
188. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining
that if a jury found that an employer’s concern about employees’ children was a reason for
denying her promotion, the employer committed sex discrimination). The court noted that
this would be an example of a “sex plus” Title VII claim. Id. at 43.
189. See supra Part I.C.
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future. Female managers who are not offered those earlier opportunities
cannot prove their capabilities in a similar fashion, even if they possess
similar or greater talent. Consequently, lengthy periods of gender inequity
in decisional authority can then become the foundation for employers to
justify imposing unequal pay or promotion opportunities between its male
and female managers. At this later stage, the differing levels of pay or
authority may appear justified based on the female manager’s history of
fewer or less important exercises of decision-making power.
When an employer exhibits implicit bias in distributing decision-making
authority, legal precedent would also support a manager’s discrimination
claim. For example, in a disparate treatment case, a circuit court found
implicit bias where a city offered a minority-owned business an economic
development loan containing more stringent conditions than those reflected
in its loan offerings to white-owned businesses.190 Rather than alleging
racial bias, the plaintiff-business presented facts surrounding its interactions
with the city “from which animus might be inferred.”191 By eliminating the
plausible, legitimate reasons for the city’s disparate treatment between the
minority-owned business and the white-owned businesses, the plaintiff
presented implicit bias as the only rational explanation for the city’s
behavior.192 This strategy has been effective in several cases involving
implicit racial bias.193 A similar strategy can be helpful to a plaintiff who
eliminates all of the permissible causes behind her employer’s distribution of
decisional power, which leaves only the discriminatory ones.194
Another court supported a finding of implicit bias by highlighting a
supervisor’s inconsistent behavior and total absence of written criteria for his
decisions concerning the plaintiff.195 Such behavioral evidence can be useful
by a plaintiff making a claim of discriminatory distribution of power and
authority. An employee can build part of her argument from evidence that
her employer facilitates informal decisional structures that do not explain
why certain managers are unequally allocated their respective decisional
power.196 Even in the seemingly subtler examples of discrimination,
plaintiffs can utilize prior courts’ understanding that “subjective decision190. See generally Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639 (4th Cir. 2017).
191. Id. at 654.
192. See id.
193. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment
Discrimination Cases—the Implicit Association Test Research as Social Framework
Evidence, 32 LAW & INEQUALITY 309, 327–33 (2014) (describing cases where plaintiffs
effectively removed all possible explanations for an employer’s behavior besides implicit bias
to provide a “coherent rationale” for the discriminatory employment practice). Professor
Hernández explains that where an employer assesses objective work product differently in
accordance with a worker’s race, implicit bias framework “helps explain the unexplainable.”
Id. at 328.
194. See supra Part I.B (delineating causes and contributing factors behind gender inequity
in decisional processes). The link between the cause and sex would need to be established if
an employee-plaintiff is to present them to the court. See supra Part II.B.
195. See Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 776 (E.D. Wis.
2010).
196. See supra Part I.B.
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making processes are particularly susceptible to being influenced not by
overt bigotry and hatred, but rather by unexamined assumptions about others
that the decisionmaker may not even be aware of.”197 By applying
previously successful legal strategy, highlighting the absence of sex-neutral
reasons for her receiving lesser decision-making power, and offering the
court with long-standing social-science research about sex stereotypes and
implicit bias, a plaintiff can establish a strong prima facie case for disparate
treatment and a rebuttal to her employer’s proposed bona fide occupational
qualification defense.198
A plaintiff may also succeed under Title VII’s second applicable provision.
The statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or
classify” an employee in any way that deprives that person of “employment
opportunities” or “adversely affect[s her] status as an employee” because of
her sex.199 Applying this provision to disparate treatment theory, a manager
can argue that an employer that permits factors such as organizational inertia
or homosocial reproduction to informally weigh managers’ sex as proxies for
their abilities as decision makers would be legally impermissible.200 A plain
reading of the statute shows that informal or formal processes that give
disproportionately greater authority to male managers as compared to female
managers limit and segregate females from the opportunities commensurate
with their rank and title.201 Such a distribution process deprives managers of
opportunities to engage in and learn from projects where they would have
greater decision-making power. This process also “adversely affects” a
manager’s status as an employee because with less experience and decisional
power, she becomes a less valuable manager respective to her male
colleagues, who have disproportionately greater power.202
One hurdle that may deter a plaintiff from filing suit is Title VII’s burdenshifting framework.203 A proposed cause of action may appear unworkable
within the third step in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
For parties to reach this step, an employee must establish a prima facie
discrimination claim, which is often accomplished through circumstantial
evidence.204 The next step places a minimal burden on the employer to
provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for its
employment action.205 If the employer does so, the employee must
197. Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004).
198. See supra Part II.D.1.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
200. See supra Part I.B.
201. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
202. See supra Part I.C.
203. See supra Part II.D.1.
204. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (finding that
comments about the employee’s lack of femininity evidenced sex as a motivating factor
behind employment discrimination). It is rare for plaintiffs to support their claim with direct
evidence because overt discrimination itself is much rarer. See supra Part I.
205. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (implying that
the employer need not convince the court that it acted based on its proffered reason because
the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion).
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demonstrate that the proposed legitimate business reason is merely a pretext
for a discriminatory motive.206 In the context of disparate treatment cases,
this step is often interpreted to involve unearthing some conscious duplicity
on the employer’s part.207 Such an interpretation poses a problem for a novel
gender-disparate decision-making power claim. As discussed, the gender
inequity in decision-making processes is likely the result of unconscious
discrimination such as sex stereotyping, implicit bias, and homosocial
reproduction.208 Unconscious discrimination lacks the requisite duplicity
that an employee is expected to uncover when rebutting her employer’s
proposed motives under the third step in this framework.
Plaintiffs can and must overcome a court’s expectation that they show their
employer to be deceitful. First, the statutory language itself does not require
a plaintiff to prove her employer’s duplicity to prevail in a discrimination
claim.209 A plain reading of the cited provisions does not indicate a
requirement to uncover an employer’s deceit. Moreover, even the Supreme
Court has acknowledged as much since McDonnell Douglas. The Court has
indicated that “[p]roof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of
credence is simply one form” of evidence that a plaintiff can offer to
overcome her burden.210 The plaintiff must establish enough evidence to
persuade a fact finder that the “employer’s asserted justification is false,”211
not necessarily a lie. Courts certainly need to more uniformly acknowledge
this understanding. However, a plaintiff can support this interpretation by
making arguments grounded in statutory interpretation and language from
Court opinions.
After highlighting the Court’s evolved stance on McDonnell Douglas’s
third step, a plaintiff can offer examples of her employer’s prior treatment
toward her, troubling procedural irregularities, or even “the use of subjective
criteria” through informal or unstructured evaluation schemes to rebut an
allegedly legitimate business reason.212 Documentation revealing that, in
reality, the distribution of decisional power is based on stereotypes or implicit
biases linked to a manager’s sex, rather than profit- or business-related

206. Id. at 253 (“[P]laintiff must then have an opportunity to prove . . . that the legitimate
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons . . . .”).
207. See, e.g., Foster v. Biolife Plasma Servs., LP, 566 F. App’x 808, 811 (11th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that the belief that “[a] plaintiff cannot show pretext merely by showing that an
employer’s good faith belief . . . is mistaken”); Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175
(7th Cir. 2002) (finding that “pretext” means that the employer was deceitful and covered up
the true motive behind the employment practice).
208. See supra Part I.A.
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
210. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (emphasis
added).
211. Id. at 148.
212. See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002)
(acknowledging a number of ways that a plaintiff may rebut a defendant’s proposed legitimate
reason for its action).
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reasons, could be sufficient.213 A plaintiff can overcome the third step in the
McDonnell Douglas framework even in instances where the employer truly
did not believe it was discriminating. Ultimately, even the burden-of-proof
issue that disparate treatment theory poses is not a prohibitive hurdle if a
manager frames the alleged business reason as objectively unsound in light
of other events in or aspects of her workplace.
C. Pursuing a Disparate Impact Lawsuit
Title VII’s second applicable provision makes it unlawful for an employer
“to limit, segregate, or classify” an employee in any way that deprives that
person of “employment opportunities” or “adversely affect[s her] status as
an employee” because of her sex.214 This provision allows for a challenging,
but feasible, disparate impact claim for sex-based decision-making power
disparities.
Applying this provision to a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must dissect
and show that her employer’s system of distributing decision-making
authority and power is a facially neutral employment practice that has a
discriminatory impact. Aspects of an employer’s practices, such as vague
evaluative metrics, employer inertia, or homosocial reproduction, can serve
as exemplary causes of a distributional scheme that adversely impacts
women.215 The Supreme Court has held that an employer’s use of a
mandated, non-job-related aptitude test to determine which temporary
supervisors it would award a permanent status is unlawful.216 Only 54
percent of provisional African American supervisors passed the test, while
68 percent of provisional white supervisors passed.217 The Court reasoned
that because this test effectively barred African American supervisors from
being eligible for a permanent status based on nonjob criteria, they
improperly lost employment opportunities.218 Similarly, an employer’s
failure to change its distribution scheme in a way that produces equitable
decisional power for qualified members of each sex should be considered an
improper employee classification system.
Historically, “objective” tests have been most susceptible to successful
disparate impact litigation, and employers’ informal processes to assign
decisional power can be argued to serve as one large test.219 Congress’s
213. See supra Part II.D (explaining that one strategy to create an inference of
discrimination is to eliminate all of the employer’s plausible explanations for its conduct,
leaving only the discriminatory one).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455–56 (1982); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 251–52 (1976) (affirming the acceptability of an employer test that positively related
to employee training performance).
217. Id. at 443.
218. See id.
219. See Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee
Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1527 (2002) (discussing
employers’ abandonment of objective tests, which are most vulnerable to disparate impact
litigation, and noting an overall decrease in such suits); see also John J. Donohue III & Peter
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intent behind allowing tests or metrics to measure an employee’s
qualifications in Title VII220 is embedded in the notion that an employer
should judge an employee “so that . . . sex become[s] irrelevant.”221
While employers’ distribution processes for managerial decision making
may not be as transparent as a written test, managers facing discrimination
can present their employers’ entire distribution scheme as evidence of an
unlawful employment practice. Employment practices that effectively
“‘freeze’ the status quo” from prior practices, such as shifting from a
structured222 to an informal distribution system, form the basis for a disparate
impact claim.223 The particular methods by which employers practice
homosocial reproduction in distributing decisional power also may be
explained as freezing the status quo.
A plaintiff may dissect many elements in her workplace that cause a
disparate impact. Even if a plaintiff cannot separately identify each element
of an employer’s distribution process, she may establish a claim by treating
the process as a single employment practice.224 By way of example,
programs that protect in-group members and disfavor a recent entrance of
out-group members would be characterized as an exercise of homosocial
reproduction.225
Analogous arguments have succeeded in court. Specifically, a court found
that a layoff policy based on seniority, known as a “last-hired, first-fired”
program, violated Title VII where it disproportionately disfavored female
police officers.226 The court did not consider the police department’s system
to be a bona fide seniority system under Title VII because it was preventing
a newer generation of officers, which included many more women than
previous generations, from reaching their earned seniority.227 While the
department offered multiple opportunities for its male officers to sit for a
patrolman examination, the same exam was only offered twice annually to
female officers.228 The court concluded that if a female officer could
establish that but for her sex, she would have been promoted to a more senior
position such that she would not have been susceptible to the “last-hired,

Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV.
983, 998 n.57 (1991) (estimating that disparate impact cases accounted for less than 2 percent
of all discrimination suits filed between January 1, 1985, and March 31, 1987).
220. Title VII provides that an employer may act upon the results of an ability test if that
test is “not designed, intended, or used to discriminate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2012).
221. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
222. For the purposes of this Note, a “structured” distribution scheme involves objective
evaluative metrics with multiple levels of oversight to place a check over any single subjective
opinion of a manager.
223. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430; see also supra Part I.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
225. See supra Part I.B.
226. Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 653–55 (2d Cir. 1976).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 650. Additionally, even when the department imposed a hiring freeze on all
officers, male officers were still able to receive a promotion to police trainee—an opportunity
unavailable for female officers. See id.
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first-fired” policy, then the layoff violated Title VII.229 In that case, unequal
opportunities to sit for exams among male and female officers helped to
establish causation. The gender disparity in officers subject to the last-hired,
first-fired policy is analogous to those managers facing gender-inequitable
distribution of decisional power founded on homosocial reproduction or
employer inertia. More frequent testing opportunities and greater decisional
power are both results of processes favoring a homogenous group of
employees in jobs that are historically dominated by men.
In the face of a prima facie disparate impact claim, the employer may
nonetheless prevail using a business-necessity defense. Such a defense exists
under the rationale that businesses should maintain a level of autonomy over
their business decisions.230 An employer who distributes decisional power
inequitably between managers of different genders or sexes may justify its
policy as a business necessity. One possible “necessity” could be that an
informal process for distributing decisional power maintains quality working
relationships. Another possible justification is that its distribution process
ensures a fluidity for the employer to assign managers for unforeseen needs.
An employee-plaintiff may overcome such a defense by pointing to
manifestations of homosocial reproduction in her workplace and providing
evidence of a feasible alternative employment practice that the employer
could have taken to obtain a less disparate effect.231
An alternative practice, for example, would be a multifactor process that
weighs job-related qualifications or aptitude over more subjective measures.
Job-related factors would include the monetary effectiveness of a manager’s
decision making, such as an efficient use of the budget or increased
productivity from the personnel she manages. Employers’ reliance on their
managers’ positive effect on the business or institutional goals would reduce
or even eliminate the sex disparity in decisional power by removing
distribution schemes that enable stereotypes, implicit biases, or employer
inertia to thrive.
Under particular circumstances, a manager can prevail under either
disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. While each bears unfavorable
characteristics, one theory likely is more promising and preferred than
another.
D. The Most Viable Path to Success
Disparate treatment litigation presents more favorable odds of success and
less challenging impediments than a lawsuit based on disparate impact
theory. Beyond the relatively less challenging prima facie case to establish,

229. Id. at 654.
230. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2518 (2015) (“[D]isparate-impact liability must be limited so employers and other
regulated entities are able to make the practical business choices and profit-related decisions
that sustain . . . the free-enterprise system.”).
231. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 558 (2009).
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disparate treatment also offers greater incentive for an employee to pursue
litigation in the first place.
One prohibitive aspect of disparate impact litigation is the statutory
scheme’s available remedies.232
Particularly, punitive damages are
unattainable in disparate impact suits, which may contribute to the dearth of
litigation in this class of cases. As high-ranking employees, managers stand
to lose their reputations, jobs, and wealth in pursuing a novel discrimination
claim over decision-making power distribution. For managers working in
niche markets, where there are few alternate firms for employment,
managers’ decisions to seek legal redress could have acute repercussions on
their careers. Their lawsuits would brand these managers as litigious and
potentially close them off from employment elsewhere. Therefore, as a
logistical calculation, the remedy a manager receives from the litigation must
outweigh the risks associated with it. The equitable remedies that disparate
impact cases offer may make a manager whole, however, they probably
would not outweigh the risk of stigma from filing the case in the first place.
Conversely, those pursuing disparate treatment claims are eligible to
obtain punitive damages.233 In order to do so, plaintiffs must establish their
employer’s “malice” or “reckless indifference” towards employees’
rights.234 With subtle infrastructural processes often causing gender inequity
in decision-making processes,235 proving a claim for punitive damages
certainly could be challenging. But this remedy is not unattainable and it
helps to balance a potential plaintiff’s risk analysis. In lieu of punitive
damages, a court should otherwise apply an equitable reinstatement remedy
to successful plaintiffs. Beyond correcting the imbalanced distribution of
decision-making power, a court may direct the employer to reinstate a female
manager to the same position that her previously advantaged male colleagues
have reached.236 For instance, if certain advantaged male managers are
deemed more immediately deserving of a future bonus or promotion,
previously disadvantaged female managers should be meaningfully
considered alongside them. Employers may also be directed to reinstate a
female manager by removing any previously created ranking system of its
managers and starting afresh. These equitable solutions would reduce the
risk that future plaintiffs assume through litigation and increase their
incentive to pursue legal remedies because even if they face stigma following
their suit, that stigma does not affect their professional status.

232. See supra Part II.E.
233. See supra Part II.E.
234. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999).
235. See supra Part I.
236. See supra Part II.E (explaining that a court may grant injunctive relief or whatever
relief it sees fit once a plaintiff establishes liability and overcomes any of an employer’s
affirmative defenses).
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E. Judicial Unawareness
The complete lack of case law raising the issue of sex-disparate decisionmaking power suggests that the judiciary may not be aware of the problem.
Where employers impose subtle but distinct sex-based expectations upon
their male and female employees, those expectations can become
professional norms that go unquestioned.237 Historically, women’s rights
activists eroded such norms by questioning the thinking behind employers’
presumptions of sex-based differences between employees—presumptions
that seemed to warrant their differing expectations.238 Importantly, cases that
attacked an employer’s presumptions about sex differences among its
workers were brought to court.239 The only way to raise judicial awareness
of this novel claim is to bring litigation and once again question
contemporary presumptions about sex differences.
CONCLUSION
As the more overt forms of employment discrimination have subsided,
women in leadership roles continue to endure inequity that hinders not only
their careers but also their workplaces’ overall success. The subtler forms of
sex discrimination are not at all new; however, they merit more attention
today. The plain language of Title VII supports a novel sex discrimination
claim targeting inequitable decision-making power. Despite the legal hurdles
that exist for a plaintiff to successfully establish her claim, litigation is a
promising way to genuinely relieve the institutional discrimination she faces.
Managers are unlikely to find success from internal complaints in their
workplaces because their employers have little incentive to suddenly reform
their processes for distributing decision-making power. Distributing unequal
managerial decision-making power and authority can be subtle and even
understated if an employer maintains a historical disposition in favor of male
managers. Litigation offers long-lasting reform to employment practices that
produce gender-disparate decision-making power. By applying existing law
to less perceptible discrimination and changing industry standards of
decisional power distribution, female managers can secure their own
professional futures and ensure that their successors are substantively
reaching the roles they have always worked toward.

237. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1105–06 (describing how gender-based expectations
over employees’ appearance, such as makeup for women or short hair for men, become selfperpetuating cycles causing a social expectation to become a professional norm).
238. Id. at 1107.
239. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

